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The essays included in this volume are the result of a series of workshops 
organized by the United Kingdom-Latin America Network for Political 
Philosophy (UKLAPPN). The Network is sponsored by the British Academy 
of the United Kingdom and brings together academics from Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Spain and the United Kingdom, 
who work in the field of contemporary political philosophy. As the title 
suggests, the main topic the volume addresses has to do with the nature, 
justification and implementation of socioeconomic human rights.
The normative relevance of socioeconomic human rights cannot be 
overlooked. According to the World Bank, 736 million people are situated 
below the poverty line of USD 1,90 per day and many of them die every year 
due to poverty-related causes (World Bank 2015). Severe poverty is thus 
one the most serious threats to human dignity of our time and the aim of 
socioeconomic human rights is precisely to conquer that threat. 
International human rights law proclaims a wide array of socioeconomic 
rights, including rights to nutritious food, shelter, medical care, housing, 
education and social security (UN 1966). In the academic literature, there 
is some consensus that the fulfillment of these rights is essential if we want 
individuals to flourish as human persons. The reasonable assumption 
underpinning this view is that someone who is starving, illiterate or 
seriously ill becomes materially unable to make a valuable use of her 
freedoms and to lead a distinctively human life. So if we think that 
individuals have a fundamental right to develop their agency, we have 
decisive moral reasons to care about the satisfaction of their socioeconomic 
needs.
In spite of this consensus, there are also deep controversies about the 
normative justification of socioeconomic human rights. Some think that 
they are not genuine human rights because they are not universal: 
individuals can only claim them against modern political institutions and 
they would have no clear addresses in alternative scenarios. Instead, other 
authors insist that the list of socioeconomic rights proclaimed by current 
instruments is too demanding. In their opinion, people may have a human 
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right to the resources they need for subsistence but they should not be 
recognized rights to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health, free higher education, maternity leave or periodic holidays with 
pay (UN 1966). International instruments may have gone too far by placing 
societies under extremely burdensome or even unfeasible obligations. 
Finally, some liberal theorists argue that socioeconomic rights are 
secondary and less important than other categories of rights.
From a legal point of view, socioeconomic human rights enjoy the same 
status as civil and political ones. As the 1993 Vienna Declaration sustains, 
all human rights are indivisible, interdependent and equally important 
(UN 1993). In consequence, governments cannot pick and choose; they 
have a strict legal obligation to satisfy all our human rights at once. 
However, there are a number of crucial theoretical issues that must be 
urgently addressed if we want socioeconomic human rights to live up to 
their aspirations. Fundamentally, this is because international instruments 
provide no clear guidelines as to what States must do in order to honor 
their responsibilities in this respect. The 1966 International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights defines its party’s obligations in the 
following terms:
“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, 
individually and through international assistance and cooperation, 
especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available 
resources, with a view to achieving progressively, the full realization of 
the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures” (UN 1966, 
Article 2).
The evident problem with this key article is that the idea of progressive 
realization up to the maximum of available resources is extremely opaque. 
What are the resources available to a state? Does this clause only refer to its 
annual budget or it also includes all the resources governments could 
potentially collect through more progressive fiscal schemes and the full 
use of their natural resources? In practice, this vague language became a 
major obstacle for the effective realization of socioeconomic human rights 
as it makes almost impossible to decide when states have done enough to 
honor their commitments under the Covenant. 
In a number of additional documents, the UN Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights tried to specify the extent of states’ obligations. 
In its General Comment 3 (1991), it establishes the existence of a “minimum 
core obligation” to ensure the satisfaction minimum essential levels of 
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each of the rights:
“Thus, for example, a State party in which any significant number of 
individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary 
health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of 
education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the 
Covenant. If the Covenant were to be read in such a way as not to 
establish such a minimum core obligation, it would be largely deprived 
of its raison d’être” (#10). 
Nevertheless, the notion of a “minimum core” is once more presented 
as dependent on the availability of resources: 
“By the same token, it must be noted that any assessment as to whether a 
State has discharged its minimum core obligation must also take account 
of resource constraints applying within the country concerned” (#10).    
Finally, the Committee’s analysis of the clause of “progressive 
realization” is considerably abstract and offers no operative orientation as 
to how to make sense of such requirement:
“It thus imposes an obligation to move as expeditiously and effectively 
as possible towards that goal. Moreover, any deliberately retrogressive 
measures in that regard would require the most careful consideration 
and would need to be fully justified by reference to the totality of the 
rights provided for in the Covenant and in the context of the full use of 
the maximum available resources” (#9).
Unfortunately, the Committee never spells out what may count as a 
legitimate reason to postpone the satisfaction of socioeconomic rights or 
to justify the adoption of retrogressive measures. 
In the specialized literature there is also an intense ongoing debate 
about the judicial enforcement of socioeconomic rights. Many authors 
argue that courts lack the legitimacy and the technical expertise required 
to make decisions about the allocation of scarce resources. Their claim is 
that socioeconomic human rights are not rights in the technical sense; 
they should rather be regarded as non-justiciable standards that 
governments must observe when designing their public policies and 
economic plans.
In recent years courts have developed some interesting strategies to 
deal with the difficulties that motivate these objections. In its influential 
sentence Government of the Republic of South Africa vs. Grootboom and 
Others, the Supreme Court of South Africa sustained that the housing 
program implemented by the local government of Cape Town was 
unsatisfactory (Constitutional Court of South Africa 2000). Its main 
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argument was that while the government was investing a significant 
amount of resources in the program, the plan included no special measures 
to address the situation of those people who lacked even a precarious 
shelter for their families. Two aspects of the sentence make it particularly 
interesting. First, the Court recognizes that resources are limited and that 
judges have no authority to make decisions about their allocation. Second, 
the sentence does not order the government to provide any particular 
individual with immediate access to housing, but simply insists that the 
Executive should develop an alternative program that incorporates its 
recommendations.
The Grootboom sentence is certainly innovative. It shows that courts 
have some promissory resources to enforce the satisfaction of 
socioeconomic rights without invading the competences of democratic 
institutions. Yet, many critics object that the strategy adopted by the Court 
was too weak both because it established no clear standards for policy 
makers and because it failed to provide immediate relief to thousands of 
people living in miserable conditions. 
As we see, socioeconomic human rights raise a number of questions of 
critical import for human rights theory and practice: what concrete 
measures must nations undertake to fulfill the socioeconomic rights of 
their inhabitants? When can a state legitimately claim that it is promoting 
their satisfaction up the maximum of its available resources? To what 
extent can their effective implementation be monitored by courts and 
what specific judicial techniques should they apply when supervising the 
conduct of governments? Can courts force elected functionaries to advance 
certain public policies instead of the plans supported by the people through 
electoral processes? Do they have the authority and skills to supervise the 
social programs chosen by democratic governments?
The essays in this volume explore some of these issues from a 
philosophical perspective. Mariano Garreta Leclercq argues against the 
constitutionalization and judicial implementation of socioeconomic 
human rights. In his view, when courts or expert committees unilaterally 
implement complex economic plans that are not approved through 
democratic mechanisms, they undermine the autonomy of the citizenry. 
This conclusion is backed by three general assumptions. The first one 
claims that there are deep controversies about the kinds of policies that 
could maximize the satisfaction of socioeconomic rights; the second one 
asserts that if those policies go wrong they could impose significant costs 
on the population and may even have a negative impact on the satisfaction 
of the essential needs of thousands of individuals; and the third assumption 
claims that treating persons as fully autonomous agents implies refraining 
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from imposing risks on them, unless the potential victims have freely 
agreed to undertake those risks. As a result, it is up to the people to decide 
what concrete measures to implement in order to bring about the 
satisfaction of socioeconomic human rights.
The essays by Eduardo Rivera López and Saladin Mackled-García 
investigate the normative structure of socioeconomic rights and human 
rights in general. Eduardo Rivera López claims that socioeconomic rights 
differ from classical liberal rights in a relevant aspect. The normative core 
of liberal rights is composed by “deontological constraints” not to treat 
people in certain ways. In this sense, the government cannot infringe the 
freedom of expression of an individual just by arguing that this will 
maximize the overall satisfaction of that same right. By contrast, 
socioeconomic rights are sensitive to aggregative considerations: 
governments may legitimately refuse to satisfy my right to an adequate 
diet if this implies that more people will have access to nutritious food in 
the immediate future. According to the author, this conceptual asymmetry 
between liberty rights and socioeconomic rights has important 
implications in terms of their enforcement by courts. In essence, while 
judges can protect individuals from discriminatory policies or order that 
some particular individuals be granted access to certain goods or services, 
they should refrain from sanctioning or recommending the implementation 
of specific public policies aimed at maximizing the overall fulfillment of 
socioeconomic rights.  
In turn, Saladin Meckled-García sustains that all categories of human 
rights involve two distinct kinds of obligations: “decisive obligations” and 
“weighting obligations”. Decisive obligations are obligations not to take 
certain considerations into account when we decide how to treat an 
individual. So governments have a decisive obligation not to curtail 
people’s access to certain public services or freedoms based on their 
gender, religion or ethnic origin. On the other hand, weighting obligations 
are obligations to give a fair weight to the needs and interests of separate 
persons. For example, when deciding what to do in order to promote my 
right to medical care, the government must balance my interest in enjoying 
that service versus the interests of other members of society in not paying 
higher taxes. The conclusion of the paper is that because human rights 
cannot be reduced to purely decisive obligations but also involve weighting 
ones, then any plausible account of human rights must include concrete 
principles as to how burdens and benefits must be distributed among 
members of a human community. Otherwise, the view would be seriously 
incomplete as it would fail to guide the action of political institutions. 
Finally, Leticia Morales develops an original argument in favor of 
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adopting a universal basic income scheme that allows people to satisfy 
their most essential needs. Her main ambition is to show that this kind of 
policy is valuable and morally mandatory not because it promotes the 
freedom of individuals, but because it improves the legitimacy of 
democratic institutions. The reasonable assumption that underlies this 
claim is that poverty constitutes a major obstacle to political participation 
and seriously discourages it. As a result, the implementation of a basic 
income scheme is not only a plausible strategy to advance the fulfillment 
of socioeconomic rights; it is also an integral component of a well-ordered 
democratic society.   
In sum, the essays in this volume offer a comprehensive introduction to 
the philosophy of socioeconomic human rights and try to come up with 
concrete answers to some of the most important questions they raise. Our 
hope is that these contributions will stimulate the debate about their 
nature and precise implications and ultimately contribute to their 
universal realization. 
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